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Bin Cao, Member, IEEE and Muhammad Ali Imran, Senior Member, IEEE
Abstract—Blockchain has shown a great potential in Internet
of Things (IoT) ecosystems for establishing trust and consensus
mechanisms without involvement of any third party. Understand-
ing the relationship between communication and blockchain as
well as the performance constraints posing on the counterparts
can facilitate designing a dedicated blockchain-enabled IoT
systems. In this paper, we establish an analytical model for the
blockchain-enabled wireless IoT system. By considering spatio-
temporal domain Poisson distribution, i.e., node geographical
distribution in spatial domain and transaction arrival rate in
time domain are both modeled as Poisson point process (PPP),
we first derive the distribution of signal-to-interference-plus-noise
ratio (SINR), blockchain transaction successful rate as well as
overall throughput. Based on the system model and performance
analysis, we design an algorithm to determine the optimal
full function node deployment for blockchain system under
the criterion of maximizing transaction throughput. Finally the
security performance is analyzed in the proposed networks with
three typical attacks. Solutions such as physical layer security are
presented and discussed to keep the system secure under these
attacks. Numerical results validate the accuracy of our theoretical
analysis and optimal node deployment algorithm.
Index Terms—Blockchain, IoT, Node Deployment, Consen-
sus Mechanism, Transaction Throughput, Security Performance
Analysis
I. INTRODUCTION
IoT is envisioned as one of the most promising technologies
for constructing a global network with machines and devices
which will gradually cover almost all aspects of the human
life [1], [2]. With such an important role it plays in our life,
there is a consensus that the security problem is of the first
priority of IoT [3], [4], due to the easy accessibility and hard-
ware/software constraints on IoT devices. Thus, tremendous
effort and cost need to be invested to update these devices
once any vulnerability is detected. Moreover, in the current
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centralized IoT system, a cloud server is necessary for the
identification, authorization and communication among low-
end devices, resulting in huge expenditure on construction
and maintenance of servers. Finally, in the centralized IoT
system, due to the involvement of the third party, the high
agent cost makes smart contract [5] (such as micro payment
and information exchange) among devices unattractive, and
thus poses a bottleneck on the prosperous of IoT ecosystems.
A. Preliminaries: Blockchain
In order to effectively address the aforementioned problems,
intensive work has been done. As a revolution in systems of
record, blockchain has been regarded as a promising technol-
ogy to address IoTs trust and security concerns, as well as
high maintenance cost problem [5], [6]. Proof of work (PoW)
based blockchain is the underling technique of Bitcoin, which
has became a revolutionary decentralized data management
framework. For example, in the application of stipulating smart
contracts, the contract is stored and updated by devices them-
selves on chains, which are created and broadcast by those
users authorized by a consensus mechanism. The blockchain
is formed by a continuously growing set of data blocks, and
each data block is generated by processing the transaction
information with certain cryptography algorithms [7]. The
main principles underlying the blockchain are summarized as
follows [8], [9]:
1) The transactions happen directly between peers instead of
through a central server, and each transaction information
will be forwarded to all other nodes.
2) Each node within the blockchain has the right to access to
the entire database, and contribute to the calculation and
verification of the new block generated by the collected
transactions.
3) Various cryptography algorithms and consensus mecha-
nisms1 are implemented to guarantee the records in the
database. It is extremely difficult for any single party to
tamper or delete the records as they are correlated to every
transaction record came before them.
1Except the most commonly used PoW based consensus mechanism, many
other lower computational complexity mechanisms are proposed such as PoS
(proof of stake) based [10] and DAG (Direct Acyclic Graph) based [11]
blockchains. However, the framework proposed in this paper can underpin
all these blockchain consensus mechanisms. In this paper, we will take PoW
based mechanism as an example.
24) The system is secure as long as a certain percentage of
CPU power (for example 51% in PoW system) within
the system is not controlled by any cooperating group of
attacker nodes.
Because of the above features, blockchain technique enables
the progress and cost effective, highly safe transaction, which
is exactly the missing part of the current IoT ecosystems.
Specifically, blockchain allows the secured and reliable trans-
actions/communications between two smart devices without
the need of centralized authority, which improves the settle-
ment time from days to almost instantaneous [12] apart from
saving agent fees. As such, International Data Cooperation
(IDC) forecasts that around 20% of the deployed IoT systems
will enable basic blockchain services in 2019 [13].
B. Motivations
Although good prospects can be expected, there are some
problems associated with the combination of blockchain and
IoT. As pointed by [5], it is computationally intensive and
power consuming to implement the current blockchain tech-
nique (especially PoW based one), but most of the IoT
devices may not bear the necessary computing capability,
memory space as well as power supplement to run and
store blockchain. Relevant state-of-the-art work focuses on the
blockchain protocols design in terms of consensus mechanism
[5], [10], [11], trust and privacy [7], [8], etc. while no more
consideration on an efficient network architecture to support
low cost blockchain-enabled wireless IoT system. Only the au-
thors in work [14] propose a blockchain-enabled IoT network
architecture with requirement of central management which is
more suitable for a small local network (such as smart home
in that paper).
From the communication perspective, in the traditional
blockchain systems, a common assumption is that communica-
tions among the nodes are perfect without any throughput and
delay constraints. However, considering the unstable channel
quality, interference, limited resource and various network
topology, it is necessary to investigate the impact of wireless
communication on the overall blockchain-enabled IoT system.
In particular, some fundamental metrics such as signal-to-
interference-plus-noise ratio (SINR) and throughput should
be analyzed to show how the wireless communication qual-
ity may affect/constrain the blockchain-enabled IoT network
deployment (e.g., node distribution), protocols (e.g., size of
block, frequency of transactions) and transaction consensus
delay, etc. On the other hand, given a transaction throughout
bound in blockchain (e.g., one block in every 10 minutes as
defined in Bitcoin [15]), it is valuable to know how to deploy
the IoT nodes that can optimally meet this bound. In general,
the performance of blockchain-enabled IoT system in terms of
transaction throughput (the number of confirmed transactions
in a unit time), communication throughput (the amount of
transmitted data in a unit time), transaction successful rate
should be associated with both blockchain transaction arrival
rate in time domain and nodes geographic distribution in
spatial domain. Therefore, a fundamental challenge is that how
to establish a valid framework of analytical model considering
the two-dimensional randomness to evaluate the performance
of blockchain-enabled IoT system.
Although there has been tremendous research work on
wireless network modeling, the existing performance analysis
focusing on traditional wireless networks cannot be directly
applied to blockchain-enabled IoT system due to the lack
consideration of blockchains. Work [16]–[18] exploit stochas-
tic geometry to evaluate the network performance in terms
of association probability, throughput and outage probability,
for traditional cellular networks [16], heterogeneous cellular
networks [17] and millimeter wave networks [18], respectively.
These investigations focus on spatial domain without the
consideration of time domain whose characteristics are much
different for blockchains. Most existing work that simulta-
neously considers spatial and time domains, such as [19]–
[21], combining queueing theory and stochastic geometry to
evaluate delay performance. However, considering the charac-
teristics of blockchain (e.g., low transaction arrival rate, limited
transaction throughput), the performance evaluations could be
much different.
In addition to communication performance analysis for
block-enabled IoT system, security performance analysis is
also necessary when some attacks exist in this system. Con-
sidering the vulnerable wireless links, the types of attacks
could be various. To the best of the authors’ knowledge, there
is no such analytical models dedicated to blockchain-enabled
wireless IoT systems.
C. Contributions and Organizations
In this paper, we first present a new network model for
blockchain-enabled IoT system. Then we theoretically analyze
the performance of the blockchain-enabled IoT system, and
propose an optimal blockchain full function node2 deployment
based on the analysis. Numerical results show that the differ-
ence between analytical and simulation results is as low as 4%,
which clearly validate the accuracy of our theoretical analysis.
The main contributions of this paper can be summarized as
follows:
• We present a blockchain-enabled wireless IoT system
model, where some full function nodes are deployed to
fulfill the functions of blockchain thus to support the
transactions between other low-end IoT devices. More-
over, we clarify the two key concepts in blockchain-
enabled IoT networks: blockchain transaction throughput
and communication throughput, and derive the mathemat-
ical relationship between them.
• We theoretically analyze the performance of blockchain-
enabled IoT system. In detail, considering the spatio-
temporal domain Poisson point process (PPP) modeling,
i.e., node geographical distribution and transaction arrival
rate in time domain, we derive the probability density
function (PDF) of SINR for a transmission from an IoT
node to a full function node. Accordingly, the transaction
2Full function node has high computing and storage power with full
functionalities to support blockchain protocols, which will be explained in
detail in Section II.
3successful rate and overall communication throughput are
analytically calculated.
• Given the derived analytical model, a searching algorithm
is proposed to find the optimal blockchain full function
node deployment under a given IoT node density and
blockchain transaction throughput.
• The security performance is analyzed in the proposed
system with three typical kinds of attacks, i.e., eclipse
attack, random link attack and random node attack.
Solutions such as physical layer security are presented
and discussed to keep the system secure under such
attacks. Simulation results show that under these attacks,
the proposed system model is still valid.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II,
we present the system model for blockchain-enabled wireless
IoT networks. In Section III, we theoretically analyze the
performance of blockchains in IoT systems. Then we pro-
pose an optimal blockchain full function node deployment in
Section IV based on the performance analysis. The security
performance analysis is presented in Section V. In Section
VI, we present the numerical results. Finally, Section VII
concludes this paper.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
In this section, we first present the blockchain-enabled IoT
network model, and then describe the wireless communication
model by considering the spatio-temporal domain characteris-
tics of this network.
A. Blockchain-enabled IoT Network Model
Consider a blockchain-enabled IoT network shown in Fig. 1,
which consists of two main elements: IoT transaction nodes
(TNs) and full function nodes (FNs). TNs can be basically
seen as traditional low-cost low-power IoT devices supported
by blockchain system. At any time point, the TNs can be
classified as two types: active TNs with data being transmitted
and idle TNs with no transmissions. Note that the two states
of a TN can be switched. The detailed time domain charac-
teristics will be further discussed in the next subsection. FNs
are the nodes in blockchain with high computing and storage
power. They have full functionalities to support blockchain
protocols thus to take charge of transaction confirmation, data
storage and building new blocks. To guarantee the security and
improve the effectiveness in blockchain, FNs are connected
with each other through high data rate links via independent
interface. In addition, all FNs connect with TNs through wire-
less communications. Transactions can be seen as any valuable
information transmitted between TNs. They are confirmed by
FNs, and stored in blocks.
A transaction process can be described as follows. Once a
transaction arrives to a specific TN, the TN should broadcast
the information to FNs by using wireless IoT networks. This
information should be received by as many FNs as possible to
enhance the security level, however, in this paper, as a starting
point, we assume that each transaction successfully received
by a single FN is secure. Nevertheless, our analysis framework
can be generalized to the scenario where each transaction
Functions
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Fig. 1. Blockchain-enabled IoT network model
should be successfully received by multiple FNs. The received
information by an FN through wireless channel will be shared
within all FNs via the dedicated connections (e.g., wired links
in this paper). Then the FN which has the right of building a
block will insert this transaction into the chain, and all FNs
need to update their own ledger accordingly. Note that our
focus in this paper is uplink transmission from TN to FN.
While the downlink performance analysis can be performed
in a similar manner, which is out of the scope of this paper.
The association relationship between TNs and FNs is not
fixed. More specifically, Fig. 1 presents an instantaneous
network state at a certain time. Note that the network state
including the active TNs, the active FNs, the association
relationship between TNs and FNs, etc. can be dynamic along
with time. In other word, TNs can choose a suitable FN to be
served according to current network state (In this work, we
assume that TNs choose the nearest trust-able FN.). Please
note that the FN set and some nodes in the TN set can
dynamically switch depending on the needs. In the case of
an FN is shut down or attacked, the TNs which are associated
with this FN can be associated with other nearby trust-able
FNs. Therefore, the centralization problem can be avoided in
our system.
We assume that some malicious FN nodes exist in the
network, and the percentage of the malicious FN nodes do not
exceed the half thus does not violate the security requirement
of blockchain system. Also, the malicious FNs can make
Denial of Service (DoS) attack (e.g., reject to forward). In
this case, it is equivalent to the FNs are shut down, and the
TNs associated with them will seek for other nearby FNs.
However, the malicious FNs cannot change the transaction
since it is authenticated by digital signature [22]. If any part of
the transaction is modified by the malicious FN, the signature
would be invalidated, thus this transaction cannot be inserted
into a block. As a result, the TN will seek for other nearby
FNs when the transaction is not confirmed within predefined
duration. In this case, mathematically, it is equivalent to the
case of FN is shut down as well.
We assume that the connection between FNs can be several
types including wired link, wireless point to point link, wired
and wireless hybrid relay link, as shown in Fig. 1. The
connection type between two specific FNs is determined by
the environment around the two FNs. For example, traditional
wireless link can be used when the distance between the
two FNs is short, while wired link should be used in the
4complicated environment. Moreover, for the large scale IoT
networks, the wired-wireless hybrid connections could be
more practical and cost effective.
Before moving to wireless communication model, we need
to clarify two definitions in blockchain-enabled IoT networks:
transaction throughput and communication throughput. Trans-
action throughput is defined as the number of transactions con-
firmed in a unit time by the blockchain system. Usually we use
transactions per second (TPS) as the metric. In communication
unlimited case without delay and throughput constraints, TPS
is typically limited by the block size, consensus mechanism
as well as the transaction arrival rate. For example, the max-
imum TPS of Bitcoin and Ethereum is 7 and 20 respectively
[23]. Communication throughput is defined as the amount of
transmitted data in a unit time for this network. Usually we
use bits per second (bps) as the unit. It is related to wireless
channel condition, radio resource allocation as well as radio
access technology (e.g., LTE, WiFi). In the wireless blockchain
networks, the required communication throughput R can be
calculated based on the transaction throughput CT as follows:
R ≥ LCT , (1)
where L is the packet length for a transaction. As the lim-
itation of CT , there is a maximum required communication
throughput.
B. Wireless Communication Model
We present the wireless communication model with respect
to the spatio-temporal domain characteristics of blockchain-
enabled IoT networks. We first describe the network spatial
distribution. Let A be the considered two-dimensional area
where TNs and FNs are assumed to be distributed as a
homogeneous PPP with density λd and λf respectively. It is
practical to assume that the minimum distance between a TN
and an FN is set as dmin. The association rule between TNs
and FNs is based on distance, i.e., a TN is associated with the
nearest FN.
Then, we describe the time domain characteristics of
blockchain-enabled IoT networks. For a specific TN, once
a transaction arrives, the TN should be in active mode to
broadcast the information to FNs. Fig. 2 shows the time
domain characteristics for a case of 4 TNs in Fig. 1, where
we find that at time t1, TN 1 and TN 3 are active, and thus
TN 3 could generate interference to TN 1 and vice verse;
while at time t2, TN 2, 3 and 4 interfere with each other. The
transaction packet length L is usually very short. In 3GPP
Standard, the data packet size (i.e., active time of TN) can be
modeled as Pareto distribution with shape parameter alpha =
2.5 and minimum data packet size = 20 bytes [24]. Therefore,
the expectation of the data packet size in IoT network is around
33.3 bytes, which can be transmitted in a single Transmission
Time Interval (TTI) in 1 ms by using Long Term Evolution
(LTE) system [25]. Moreover, the traffic arrival rate is as low
as from half an hour to even several hours [24], implying
that the traffic of IoT nodes is not very active. Hence, based
on the above two reasons, it is reasonable to assume that the
TNs active time is a small constant with t T , and thus the
number of arrived transactions M in time T can be assumed
to be a Poisson distribution with parameter λa T .
Time
time t1
TN 1
TN 2
TN 3
TN 4
time t2
...
...
...
...
...
...
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...
: active time
: idle time
Fig. 2. The arrival traffic of TNs in time domain.
For the wireless channel, as mentioned in Section II.A, we
focus on uplink transmission in this work. Consider a specific
TN served by an FN, the desired signals experience path loss
g(d) where d is the distance between the TN and the FN.
Define interference TN as the TNs that generate interference
to the considered TN. Obviously, from the time domain, as
indicated in Fig. 2, only the active TNs could be counted as
interference TNs. In addition, from the spatial domain, we
assume only the TNs within a certain circular area, where the
serving FN is located as the center with radius D0 as shown in
Fig. 3, could contribute to the interference. We set the transmit
power of all TNs as P . Therefore, the received SINR can be
expressed as
SINR(D1, NI ,D2) =
Pg(D1)∑NI
i=1 Pg
(
D
(i)
2
)
+ σ
, (2)
where D1 is the distance between the desired TN and the serv-
ing FN, D2 =
[
D
(1)
2 , D
(2)
2 , ..., D
(NI)
2
]
is the distance vector
for all interference TNs, NI is the number of interference TNs,
and σ is the noise power. Denote β as the SINR threshold that
FNs can successfully decode the received information bits. For
convenience, the frequently used notations are summarized in
Table I.
D0
 2
(!
) 澳
:  Desired TN
:  Interference TN
: Serving FN of the considered TN
Fig. 3. Interference area for a specific TN
III. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS IN BLOCKCHAIN-ENABLED
WIRELESS IOT NETWORKS
In this section, we theoretically analyze the transmission
performance in terms of SINR, transaction data packet (TDP)
transmission successful rate as well as overall communication
throughput by considering the blockchain characteristics, such
as short transaction packet length, low TN active rate and
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FREQUENTLY USED NOTATIONS
Notation Definition
A the whole considered area
D0 radius of interference area
D1 distance between desired TN and the serving FN
D2 distance vector of all interference UEs (a vector)
D
(i)
2 distance between interference TN i and the FN
λd TN density
λf FN density
λa blockchain transaction arrival rate
Mi number of arrival transactions in time T for TN i
N0 the number of total TNs
K the number of TNs in interference area
NI the number of interference TNs
t radio transmission time for a transaction
T the total considered time
L the packet length of each blockchain transaction
P TN transmit power
g(d) channel path loss model (a function of distance)
fX probability density function of random variable X
limited transaction throughput. In detail, we first derive the
probability density function (PDF) of SINR according to
the spatio-temporal domain modeling, and then calculate the
blockchain TDP transmission successful rate based on the PDF
of SINR. Finally, we obtain the PDF of overall communication
throughput in a close-form expression under the constraints of
blockchain transaction throughput and the TDP transmission
successful rate.
A. Probability Density Function of SINR
Let us start with SINR distribution analysis. As both TNs
and FNs are geographically distributed as homogeneous PPP,
it is reasonable to investigate the SINR performance of any an
arbitrary TN. To derive the PDF of SINR in (2), the desired
signal power and interference need to be studied separately.
For a specific TN, the desired signal power S is a random
variable written as S = Pg(D1), where D1 is the distance
between the TN and the serving FN. As transmit power P
is fixed in this work, S is only related to D1. Proposition 1
gives the PDF of D1. For convenience, we use capital letters
to denote random variables, and the corresponding lowercases
to the value of random variables.
Proposition 1. The PDF of the distance D1 between a specific
TN and the serving FN is
fD1(d1) = 2piλfd1exp{−λfpi (d1)2}. (3)
Proof: According to the association rules presented in
Section II, D1 > d1 is the event that there is no FN distributed
in the circular area with radius d1. Thus Pr(D1 > d1) =
exp{−λfpi (d1)2}. Hence, the PDF of D1 is fD1(d1) =
d
(
FD1 (d1)
)
d(d1)
= 2piλfd1exp{−λfpi (d1)2}.
Therefore, based on Proposition 1, we obtain that the PDF
of desired signal power as
fS
(
S = Pg(d1)
)
= fD1(d1) = 2piλfd1exp{−λfpi (d1)2}.
(4)
We now study the distribution of the received interference.
We start from the number of interference TNs NI . As stated in
Section II, only active TNs located in the interference area will
be counted for interference contribution3. The number of TNs
K(K ≥ NI) within the interference area is still a variable of
Poisson distribution with density parameter pi (D0)
2
λd. On the
other hand, as the transmission time for TN is t, the TNs which
are active during time period [−t, t] can bring interference. For
a TN, the number of arrived transactions is distributed as PPP
with parameter 2tλa. Therefore, the active probability for a
TN during time period [−t, t] is
Pr(active) = 1− exp{−2tλa}. (5)
The probability of the number of interference TNs NI = nI
given K = k is
Pr(NI = nI |K = k) = CnIk (1− exp{−2tλa})nI , (6)
where CnIk is the combinational number. Therefore, the PDF
of NI is
fNI (nI) = Pr(NI = nI)
=
N0∑
k=nI
Pr(NI = nI |K = k)Pr(K = k),
(7)
where
Pr(K = k) =
(pi (D0)
2
λd)
k
k!
exp{−pi (D0)2 λd}. (8)
Then we investigate the distance D(i)2 between an interfer-
ence TN i and the FN. Proposition 2 gives the PDF of D(i)2 .
Proposition 2. The PDF of the distance D2 is
f
D
(i)
2
(d
(i)
2 ) =
2d
(i)
2
(D0)
2 . (9)
where D0 is the radius of the interference area.
Proof: The interference TNs are distributed as a PPP with
density pi (D0)
2. Therefore, for TN i, the PDF of location
(X,Y ) is
f(X,Y ) =
1
pi (D0)
2 . (10)
The CDF of distance D(i)2 can be calculated as
F
D
(i)
2
(d
(i)
2 ) =
¨
X2+Y 2≤(d(i)2 )2
1
pi (D0)
2
√
X2 + Y 2dXdY
(a)
=
ˆ d(i)2
0
ˆ 2pi
0
r
pi (D0)
2 dθdr
=
(
d
(i)
2
D0
)2
,
(11)
3Note that the approximation will be removed when the area of the
considered is infinite.
6where (a) is obtained by using the following replacement{
X = r cos θ
Y = r sin θ.
(12)
Hence, based on (11), the PDF of D(i)2 is
f
D
(i)
2
(d
(i)
2 ) = F
′
D
(i)
2
(d
(i)
2 ) =
2d
(i)
2
(D0)
2 . (13)
From Proposition 2, we can express the PDF of interference
Ii generated by TN i as
fIi
(
Ii = Pg(d
(i)
2 )
)
= f
D
(i)
2
(d
(i)
2 ) =
2d
(i)
2
(D0)
2 . (14)
The total interference, denoted by I(NI ,D2), is related to the
number of interference TNs NI and the distance D2 of these
interference TNs. From (7) and (13), we have the PDF of
I(NI ,D2)
fI(NI = nI ,D2 = d2) = fNI (nI)Pr(D2 = d2|NI = nI)
= fNI (nI)
(
2
(D0)
2
)nI nI∏
n=1
d
(n)
2 .
(15)
As SINR expressed in (2) is related to D1, NI , D2, the PDF
of SINR can be expressed as
fSINR(D1 = d1, NI = nI ,D2 = d2)
= fD1(D1 = d1)fI(NI = nI ,D2 = d2),
(16)
where fD1 and fI are given in (7) and (15), respectively.
B. TDP Transmission Successful Rate
When the received SINR is greater than the threshold β, a
blockchain transaction transmission is successful. Therefore,
we need to calculate the probability Pr(SINR > β) which
can be expressed as
Pr(SINR > β) =
˚
Ω
fSINRdΩ, (17)
where Ω is the area of (D1, NI ,D2) that satisfies
SINR(D1, NI ,D2) > β. As fSINR is obtained in (16), we
only need to find the satisfied area Ω.
For the distance D1 between the desired TN and the serving
FN, it is safe to say that the SINR cannot be greater than β
when D1 > D0. Thus, the satisfied range of D1 is [0, D0].
Then, for a given D1 = d1, we need to determine the satisfied
number of interference TNs NI as well as the locations
of these TNs D2. To obtain the close-form expression of
Pr(SINR > β), we use the following approximation,
The number of interference TNs NI ∼= E(NI), (18)
where E(NI) is the expectation of random variable NI . As the
total number of TNs N0 in IoT networks is usually quite large,
this approximation is very accurate. In addition, it will be
verified in the simulation in Section V that the approximation
is very effective in all considered scenarios. Based on the TN
distribution and transaction arrival models, we have
E(NI) = E(K) · Pr(active)
= pi (D0)
2
λd(1− exp{−2tλa}) , n¯I ,
(19)
where Pr(active) is defined as (5). Thus, SINR is only related
to D1,D2, and it can be rewritten as
SINR(D1,D2) =
Pg(d1)∑n¯I
i=1 Ii + σ
. (20)
For a given D1 = d1, we have
Pr (SINR(D1 = d1,D2) > β)
= Pr
(
n¯I∑
i=1
Ii <
Pg(d1)− σ
β
)
.
(21)
Due to the high TN density in blockchain networks and the
large radius of interference area D0, n¯I is a large number.
Moreover, Ii(i = 1, 2, · · · , n¯I) is a set of random variables
with independent identically distribution, and thus
∑nI
i=1 Ii
can be seen as a normal distribution N(µI , δI2), where
µI = n¯IE(Ii) and δI =
√
n¯ID(Ii) [26]. Note that E(Ii)
and D(Ii) is the expectation and variance of variable Ii
respectively. In the following, we give the derivations of µI
and δI respectively.
µI = n¯IE(Ii)
= n¯I
ˆ D0
d
(i)
2 =dmin
Pg(d
(i)
2 )Pr(D
(i)
2 = d
(i)
2 )d(d
(i)
2 )
= n¯I
ˆ D0
d
(i)
2 =dmin
Pg(d
(i)
2 )
2d
(i)
2
(D0)
2 d(d
(i)
2 )
=
2Pn¯I
(D0)
2
(
d
(i)
2 [G(D0)−G(dmin)]− G¯(D0)− G¯(dmin)
)
,
(22)
where G is the primitive function of path loss model g(d),
and G¯ is the primitive function of G.
δI =
√
n¯ID(Ii)
=
√
n¯I
(
E
(
Ii
2
)− E2 (Ii))
=
√
n¯I
[ˆ D0
d
(i)
2 =dmin
P 2g2
(
d
(i)
2
) d(i)2
2 (D0)
2 d
(
d
(i)
2
)
−
(
µI
n¯I
)2]
.
(23)
Denote I =
∑n¯I
i=1 Ii, and I ∼ N
(
µI , δI
2
)
. Let Y = I−µIδI ,
and thus Y ∼ N (0, 1). Therefore,
Pr
(
n¯I∑
i=1
Ii <
Pg (d1)− σ
β
)
= Pr
(
Y <
Pg(d1)−σ
β − µI
δI
)
= Φ (ξ (d1)) ,
(24)
where ξ (d1) =
Pg(d1)−σ
β −µI
δI
, Φ is the cumulative density
7function of standard normal distribution. Therefore, we have
Pr(SINR > β) =
˚
Ω
fSINRdΩ
=
ˆ D0
d1=dmin
fD1 (d1) Φ (ξ (d1))d (d1) .
(25)
Note that (25) is actually the close-form expression of
Pr(SINR > β) which can be calculated analytically when
function fD1 , the value of µI , δI as well as the parameters β,
σ are given.
C. Overall Communication Throughput
Denote by R the overall required communication through-
put, which can be expressed as
R = LPr (SINR > β)
(
N0∑
i=1
Mi
)
, 0 ≤ R ≤W (26)
where N0 is the total number of TNs, Mi is the number
of arrived transactions for TN i and W is the communica-
tion throughput when the transaction throughput reaches to
the maximum value. For the given λd and λf , N0, L and
Pr(SINR > β) are constant, while Mi is a set of independent
identically PPP distributed random variables with parameter
λaT . Let M =
∑N0
i=1Mi. As N0 is a large number, M is a
random variable with normal distribution N(µM , δM 2), where
µM = N0E (Mi) and δM =
√
N0D (Mi) [26]. As Mi is
distributed as a PPP, E (Mi) = λaT , and D (Mi) = λaT .
Therefore, we have
µM = N0λaT, (27)
δM =
√
N0λaT. (28)
As mentioned in Section II, the maximum required com-
munication throughput by the blockchain system in time T is
W . Considering this constraint, Proposition 3 gives the PDF
of R.
Proposition 3. For the given λd and λf , the PDF of overall
required communication throughput R is
fR (r = mLPr (SINR > β))
=
{
fM (m) = N
(
µM , δM
2
)
, r < W
1− Φ (m∗) , r = W ,
(29)
where Φ is the cumulative density function of standard normal
distribution, and
m∗ =
W
LPr(SINR>β) − µM
δM
. (30)
Proof: For the given λd and λf , L and Pr(SINR > β)
are constant. If the overall communication throughput r <
W , we have fR (r) = fM (m) = N
(
µM , δM
2
)
. If r = W ,
mLPr(SINR > β) = W , and thus m = WLPr(SINR>β) , m˜.
Due to the maximum transaction throughput constraint, we
have fR (r = W ) = Pr(M ≥ m˜). Let Y = M−µMδM , and thus
Y ∼ N (0, 1) as M ∼ N (µM , δM 2). Thus, Pr (M ≥ m˜) =
Pr
(
Y ≥ m˜−µMδM
)
= 1−Φ( m˜−µMδM ), where Φ is the cumulative
density function of standard normal distribution.
IV. OPTIMAL FN DEPLOYMENT
For a given TN deployment, we can increase communication
throughput by deploying more FNs, and thus support higher
blockchain transaction throughput. However, as mentioned
in Section II.A, once the transaction throughput reaches the
maximum value, increasing communication throughput cannot
improve the transaction throughput any more. Thus, for the
sake of saving cost, it is worth to minimize the FN density
subject to the blockchain transaction throughput constraint.
From (26), we know that R is a function of both λf and
M , given λd and λa. To explore the relationship between
FN density λf and TN density λd, we use E(M) = µM
to calculate the conditional expectation of R as
E¨(R) = E
(
R
∣∣∣M = µM)
= min{LPr (SINR > β)µM ,W}.
(31)
(31) shows that the overall communication throughput should
increase with the number of transactions at the start, and stay
unchanged when it reaches the maximum value W (i.e., the
blockchain transactions saturated). According to (31), we find
that E¨ (R) can exactly depict this relationship. Therefore, the
following Definition 1 states the optimal FN deployment.
Definition 1. For given λd and λa, the FN deployment Θ is
optimal if the Poisson distribution density λf
∗ satisfies λf ∗ =
arg min
λf
(
E¨ (R) = W
)
.
According to Definition 1, the optimal FN deployment
problem can be formulated as:
min λf
s.t. E¨ (R) = W.
(32)
Due to the complexity of Pr (SINR > β), we cannot find
the optimal λf ∗ in a close-form solution. Fortunately, as the
monotonous increase for Pr (SINR > β) with FN density λf ,
we design Algorithm 1 to find the optimal value of FN density
λf
∗ for a given λd and λa. In Algorithm 1, we first calculate
the value of n¯I , µI , δI and ξ (d1), and then determine the
searching region of FN density, finally, we find the optimal
FN density in the searching region. The detailed steps are
stated in Algorithm 1.
We find that the major computational complexity of our
optimal FN deployment Algorithm 1 lies on the search stage,
where we should determine the optimal FN density from
the range
[
λf
0
2 , λf
0
]
. In the worst case, we need search
log2 dλf
0
2 e rounds, where  is the termination parameter. In
each round, we should calculate E¨ (R), and compare it with
the maximum value W , thus determine the new search area
for the next round. The computational complexity of these
operations in a round can be seen as a constant, denoted
as O(1). Therefore, the total computational complexity of
Algorithm 1 is O(log2 dλf
0
2 e).
8Algorithm 1 : Algorithm of optimal FN deployment.
Input: all the parameters (except λf ) and the termination
parameter  > 0.
Output: optimal FN density λf ∗.
Initialization:
1: calculate n¯I , µI , δI and ξ (d1).
Find searching region:
2: set λf 0 as the initial value
3: calculate Pr (SINR > β) and E¨ (R) based on λf 0
4: if E¨ (R) < W then
5: λf
0 = 2λf
0 and go back to line 3
6: else
7: break
8: end if
Search stage:
9: set a = λf
0
2 , b = λf
0
10: while |b− a| >  do
11: set λf ∗ = a+b2
12: calculate Pr (SINR > β) and E¨ (R) based on λf ∗
13: if E¨ (R) < W then
14: set a = λf ∗
15: else
16: set b = λf ∗
17: end if
18: end while
19: output λf ∗
V. SECURITY PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
In this section, we analyze the security performance in the
proposed system. Specifically, our analysis focuses on three
typical attacks: (a) eclipse attack, (b) random link attack and
(c) random FN attack.
A. Eclipse Attack
As stated in [27], eclipse attack is defined as that the attacker
monopolizes all the downlink and uplink connections of a TN
(denoted as a victim), thus isolating the victim from the rest
of the network. The attacker in this way can filter the victim’s
view of the blockchain, and conduct some activities for his
own purposes, such as disrupting the blockchain network,
wasting the computer power, etc. [27]. To make eclipse attacks
more difficult, several countermeasures have been proposed in
[27], including deterministic random eviction, random selec-
tion, test before evict, etc..
Besides these countermeasures in [27], we can also exploit
wireless channel characteristics as well as blockchain proto-
cols to further address eclipse attacks. Eclipse attacks can be
addressed from two aspects: physical layer security aiming at
protecting wireless links from attacks and blockchain network
protocols to avoid information modifications. Let us elaborate
them respectively.
Physical (PHY) layer security can be used to avoid the
wireless links being attacked, and thus to address DoS prob-
lem. PHY-layer authentication techniques exploit the spatial
decorrelation property of the PHY-layer information, such as
received signal strength indicators, received signal strength,
channel phase response, channel impulse responses, and chan-
nel state information to distinguish radio transmitters, and thus
detect spoofing attacks with low overhead [28].
From blockchain network protocol perspective, private key
technology should be used to avoid transaction information
modifications. Private key is actually a string of characters,
which is only known by TN itself. Each TN owns a pair of
private key and public key. The private key is used to sign
the transactions [22]. The transactions can only be made with
private and public keys. Thus, even the links of the victim
TN are monopolized the transaction information cannot be
modified by the attacker due to the lack of private key.
Therefore, by using the technologies of physical layer secu-
rity and blockchain network protocol (authentication encryp-
tion), eclipse attacks could be dealt with effectively. Moreover,
as discussed in Section II.A, when the attacked TNs are
uniformly distributed in the network, the proposed framework
is still valid by reducing the TNs density accordingly. We
will conduct a simulation to examine the system performance
when this kind of attack exists in the network, which will be
presented in Section VI.
B. Random Link Attack
Random link attack is stated as that some links are randomly
attacked or blocked due to the unstable wireless channel. This
can be improved by PHY-layer security technology as well.
Besides PHY-layer security technology, the following method
can be used for addressing this attack. By sending some
acknowledgment signaling (e.g., Hybrid Automatic Repeat
Request (HARQ) in LTE system), TNs can judge whether the
current wireless link is blocked. If the link is blocked, the
corresponding TN will connect to another nearby FN via a
non-attacked wireless link. Due to the increase of the distance
between the TN and its serving FN, the TDP (transaction data
packet) transmission successful probability (i.e., Pr(SINR >
β)) will be decreased. This can be derived from equation (25).
Therefore, the transaction throughput could be decreased with
the same FN density. However, as all FNs have the whole
blocks, thus the transaction security can also be guaranteed in
this case. Similar to eclipse attack, simulation results will be
presented in Section VI to show the validity of our model in
the presence of this attack.
C. Random FN Attack
Random FN attack is defined as that the attacker randomly
monopolizes some FNs, thus the FNs cannot communicate
with any TNs in this case. For a specific attacked FN, it
cannot serve any TNs. Based on Proposition 1, Proposition
2 and equation (25), we know that the system performance
in terms of SINR, TDP transmission successful rate, transac-
tion throughput, etc. could be degraded. However, similar to
the above two cases, when the FN are uniformly/randomly
attacked, the framework proposed by the paper is valid by
reducing the FNs density accordingly. We also conduct some
simulation experiments to verify this, which will be presented
in Section VI.
9VI. NUMERICAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS
In this section, we first validate the accuracy of our theoret-
ical analysis by comparing the theoretical results with the sim-
ulation results in different typical scenarios. Then we evaluate
the relationship between blockchain transaction throughput
and wireless communication throughput and demonstrate how
the latter can cause a bottleneck for the former. Next, we
give the optimal FN deployment under different TN densities.
Finally, we evaluate the performance of the proposed system
with three typical attacks.
A. Simulation Settings
We consider an IoT network that is composed of multiple
TNs operating blockchain transactions and multiple FNs sup-
porting blockchain service. The network coverage is set as a
circular area with radius 150 m. The radius of interference area
is D0 = 50 m. The transmit power of TN is 20 dBm, and the
noise power is -104 dBm [29]. The transaction packet length
is 256 bits [30], and the transaction arrival rate is 11800 s
−1
[24]. The total considered time is 10000 s. For convenience,
all the parameters are summarized as Table II.
TABLE II
SIMULATION PARAMETERS
Parameter Value
The radius of considered area 150 m
The radius of interference area D0 50 m
TN transmit power P 20 dBm
Path loss model g(d) g (d) = d−2.5 [17]
Total time T 10000 s
Transaction packet length L 256 bits [30]
Transaction arrival density λa 11800s
−1 [24]
Noise power σ -104 dBm [29]
B. Performance Evaluations without Attacks
In the first experiment, we examine the TDP transmission
successful rate, i.e., the probability Pr (SINR > β), with
fixed FN density 320 per km2 and varying TN density. The
analytical results are computed from equation (25). In detail,
we first calculate fD1 (the PDF of D1) based on Proposition 1.
We then obtain the value of µI and δI by using equation (22)
and (23) respectively, and thus the value of ξ (d1). Substituting
them in (25), we get Pr (SINR > β). For simulations, if the
received SINR for a transaction transmission is greater than β,
this transaction is transmitted successfully, otherwise it counts
as a failure. Fig. 4 shows the probability Pr (SINR > β)
for both analytical and simulation results with different TN
densities under SINR threshold parameter β = −15dB and
β = −9dB. From this figure, we can see that the curves
of analytical results for both β match closely to those of
simulations. For example, the successful rate for analytical
results and simulations is 76% and 77% respectively when the
TN density equals to 1.0×105 and β = −15dB, implying that
the difference between the analytical results and simulations
is trivial. Moreover, as expected, under both β = −15dB and
β = −9dB scenarios the probability Pr (SINR > β) decreas-
es with the TN density due to the increasing interference. We
also find that Pr (SINR > β) is much lower under β = −9dB
than that under β = −15dB with the same TN density due to
the stringent SINR requirement.
Fig. 4. Comparisons of Pr (SINR > β) vs. TN density (FN density is per
320 km2).
In the second experiment, we compare the TDP transmis-
sion successful rate with fixed TN density 1.0 × 105 per
km2 but varying FN densities. The analytical and simulation
results are both obtained in the same way as stated in the
first experiment. Fig. 5 shows the probability Pr (SINR > β)
for both analytical and simulation results with different FN
densities under SINR threshold parameter β. From this figure,
we again find that the differences between the analytical and
simulation results are always very small (for example, 4%
for β = −15dB and 3% for β = −9dB when FN density
is 200 per km2). These numerical results clearly validate the
accuracy of the our modeling and show the effectiveness of the
approximation in (19). Moreover, Pr (SINR > β) increases
with the FN density due to the decreasing distance between
the desired TN and the serving FN.
Next, we evaluate the performance of overall communi-
cation throughput as a function of TN density. Considering
the characteristics of the new block generation in blockchain
system (e.g., a new block with size 1 MB transaction data
is generated every 10 minutes in Bitcoin [15]), the overall
communication throughput in this paper is calculated as fol-
lows: the total data volume that is successfully transmitted
in every 10 minutes for all TNs. Due to the limitation of
the maximum transaction throughput (MTT) in blockchain,
the overall required communication throughput will stay un-
changed once the transaction throughput achieves the MTT.
Fig. 6 shows the overall throughput with varying TN density
from 1.0×105 to 1.0×106 per km2 under different parameters
β and MTT. The FN density is fixed to 5000 per km2. From
Fig. 6, we can see that the communication throughput for
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Fig. 5. Comparisons of Pr (SINR > β) vs. FN density (TN density is
1.0× 105 per km2).
all the four scenarios is increased when the TN density is
low. With TN density increasing, the curve with parameters
β = −15dB,MTT = 7TPS, β = −9dB,MTT = 7TPS
and β = −15dB,MTT = 14TPS arrives to the maximum
communication throughput sequentially. The curve with pa-
rameters β = −9dB,MTT = 14TPS cannot achieve the
maximum throughput under any TN density scenario. Note
that the throughput is not the maximum value when TN density
is 5 × 105 per km2, as it does not stay unchanged after
that. When the TN density is greater than 5 × 105 per km2,
the overall communication throughput for the parameter pair
β = −9dB,MTT = 14TPS is decreased due to the high
interference. This provides a valid theoretical guidance for the
blockchain-enabled IoT system design.
Fig. 6. Comparisons of overall throughput vs. TN density (FN density is
5000 per km2).
Fig. 7. Comparisons of overall throughput vs. FN density (TN density is
40000 per km2).
Fig. 8. Comparisons of optimal FN density vs. TN density.
In the next experiment, we investigate the relationship
between the overall communication throughput and FN den-
sity with fixed TN density 4.0 × 105 per km2. Intuitively,
under a given TN density, the more FNs are deployed,
the greater SINR would be received, and thus the higher
overall communication throughput can be achieved. Fig. 7
shows the overall communication throughput with varying
FN density from 1000 to 8000 per km2 under different
parameters β and MTT. From this figure, we can see that
the communication throughput for all the four scenarios is
increased when the FN density is low. When the throughout
reaches the maximum value, it is unchanged which means that
the transaction throughput achieves the MTT. For example,
under the circumstance β = −15dB,MTT = 7TPS, when
the FN density is higher than around 2000 per km2, the
communication throughput is unchanged, which means that
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(a) Eclipse attacks (FN density is 5000 per km2) (b) Random link attacks (FN density is 5000 per
km2)
(c) Random TN attacks (TN density is 40000 per
km2)
Fig. 9. Comparisons of overall throughput with three typical kind of attacks.
under the TN density 4.0 × 105 per km2 the optimal FN
density is about 2000 per km2. Similarly, we can find that the
optimal FN density with fixed TN density 4.0× 105 per km2
for β = −9dB,MTT = 7TPS, β = −15dB,MTT = 14TPS
and β = −9dB,MTT = 14TPS is about 4000 per km2, 5800
per km2 and larger than 8000 per km2, respectively.
Next, we investigate the optimal FN deployment with d-
ifferent TN densities. Fig. 8 shows the optimal FN density
with varying TN density from 4.0×105 to 1.5×106 per km2
under different parameters β and MTT. From this figure, we
can find that when the TN density is lower than 8.0× 105 per
km2, the optimal FN density decreases rapidly. The rationale
behind is that that the more TNs are deployed, the more
transactions happen in time T , the easier to achieve the
maximum throughput, and thus the less number of FNs are
needed. However, when the TN density is higher than 8.0×105
per km2, the optimal FN density is changed slowly. This is
because that the high interference is introduced resulting in
low TDP transmission successful rate. Therefore, although the
number of transactions is increased, the overall throughput is
changed slowly, and thus the change of the optimal FN density
is also slow.
C. Performance Evaluations with Attacks
In the following, we conduct experiments to examine
our system performance in term of overall communication
throughput for the three typical attacks, eclipse attack, random
link attack and random FN attack. All the three kinds of attacks
are set to be distributed uniformly with 10% percentage, while
the other parameters remain the same as table II. Fig. 9 shows
the comparisons of overall throughput with three kinds of
attacks in the system. From all the three sub-figures, we find
that the trend of the four curves remain the same as Fig. 6
and Fig. 7, while the absolute value of overall communication
throughput for all four curves reduces due to the attacks.
Specifically, in Fig. 9.(a) the overall communication through-
put is reduced about 10% compared with that in Fig. 6. This
is because that once a TN is suffered from eclipse attacks, it
cannot contribute any communication throughput as all links
are monopolized. In Fig. 9.(b), we find that the degradation of
overall communication throughput is much smaller than 10%
compared with that in Fig. 6. This is because that the attacker
cannot control all the connections for a TN in this case, thus
the TN can still contribute some communication throughput
although the wireless channel condition may be degraded. As
expected, the degradation of overall communication through-
put in Fig. 9.(c) is about 10% compared with that in Fig. 7
due to the attacked FNs. These results also demonstrate that
our analysis framework can still validate in the systems with
attacks.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we investigated the performance of
blockchain-enabled IoT networks. We first theoretically an-
alyzed SINR, TDP transmission successful rate as well as
overall communication throughput by considering the char-
acteristics of blockchain in spatio-temporal domain. Then,
based on the performance analysis, we designed an optimal
blockchain full function node deployment scheme to achieve
the maximum transaction and communication throughput with
the minimum full function node density. Finally, we analyzed
the security performance in the system with three typical kinds
of attacks, where we have proposed to adopt approaches such
as physical layer security algorithms to mitigate these attacks.
Numerical results validated the accuracy of our theoretical
analysis, and the difference between simulation and analytical
results is usually less than 4%.
The work in this paper provides a framework for the
blockchain-enabled wireless IoT system design through a de-
tailed spatio-temporal model. It can be served as a foundation
for future research on system performance analysis, protocols
and algorithms design. For instance, one potential research
topic is to use this model to develop new and optimized com-
munication protocols by considering the broadcasting natural
in blockchain systems. In addition, by adopting physical layer
security techniques, secure wireless blockchain system design
against active attacks can be a promising research topic.
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